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STATEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
Appellant and respondent are the only parties. 
Previously, appellantfs adult son, the son's wife, and their 
three children had been plaintiffs, but their cases had been 
settled and disposed of prior to trial and the jury herein was 
advised only of appellant and respondent as parties. 
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ISSUES 
The case presents a single issue. Is the jury 
verdict supported by the evidence? 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury case arising from an 
automobile accident. Plaintiff claimed defendant was liable* 
Defendant denied liability and denied that she had injured 
plaintiff. 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
The case was tried by jury before Judge Leonard H. 
Russon, Salt Lake County District Court. The jury found in 
answer to special interrogatories that (1) defendant was 
negligent; (2) that defendant's negligence proximately caused 
the collision; and (3): 
"3. If you answered questions 1 and 2 'yes,1 then 
answer this question: did James Lee Sanders prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
injuries, if any, were proximately caused by the 
accident in question?" 
The jury answered interrogatory #3, "No." 
Judge Russon denied plaintiff1s Motion for New 
Trial. 
-3-
DISPOSITION 
Plaintiff has a Pyrrhic victory in which defendant is 
found to be liable. Defendant has a practical victory in which 
she pays no damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is easiest to designate the parties as they stood 
at trial with appellant as "plaintiff" and respondent as 
"defendant." 
The accident occurred at 1:00 P. M., Saturday, 
September 25, 1982. (R350, L3-6). Plaintiff, a Farmer's 
Insurance Agent, had been driving north on 9th East and stopped 
for a traffic light at 4750 South, Murray, Utah (R352, L4-6). 
Plaintiff was driving. With him were his adult son, 
daughter-in-law, and their three children, plaintiff's 
grandchildren. They were on a family outing going to the Stuft 
Noodle Restaurant in Murray for lunch (R351, L10-12). 
Respondent approached from the south and at the crest 
of a hill about a block from the accident scene, she saw the 
line of stopped traffic with plaintiff's car at the end of it. 
She testified that at the top of the hill she recognized that 
she had to stop, and started to brake, that her speed was then 
30 to 35 m.p.h. That going down the hill, she testified 
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her brakes didn't stop her, so she pumped her brakes 
repeatedly, couldn't stop and ran into the rear of plaintiff's 
car. The street was wet from rain (R 647, L7-18;R 649, L6-8). 
Respondent stated there was no cause for the accident 
due to any defect in her car or her being diverted and blamed 
it solely on the wet road, feeling that she was not responsible 
for that condition and so not responsible for the accident (R 
648, L5-18; R 658, L10-12) 
In the collision, the cosmetic damage to the vehicles 
was slight but the frame of plaintiff's car was bent so that 
the right rear wheel was locked and the car was not driveable 
(R 355, L3-28). Damage to plaintiff's car was $1,300 (R 355, 
Lll-28). 
The investigating officer estimated an impact speed, 
plaintiff's car being stopped, of 15 m.p.h. This impact speed 
was concurred in by David Lord, an accident reconstruction 
expert called by plaintiff (R381,L17-R384, L15; R384, L13-
R387, LID. 
Mr. Lord also testified that the impact speed as a 
matter of kinetics was adequate to cause a severe injury to a 
passenger in plaintiff's vehicle, or to cause no injury. He 
explained that frequently extensive damage to a vehicle causes 
less injury to the passengers because the vehicle, by 
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crumpling, is absorbing the impact, while conversely moderate 
damage can indicate that the jolt of the impact is transferred 
directly to the passengers (R 396, L6-18; R 396, L21-R 397, L7; 
R 398, Ll-R 399, L12). 
Plaintiff testified that he was 53 years old when the 
accident occured, was six foot one inch tall (R364, L3/4) and 
was in good health immediately prior to the accident (R362, 
L22-R 363, L4). He said he had immediate neck and back pain on 
the impact which did not improve over the weekend, so on 
Monday, September 27, 1982, he contacted Dr. Burt Kidman, a 
chiropractor whom he had seen once a year for a period of years 
(R 438, L20-R 439, L8-20-R 439, L8). 
Plaintiff saw Dr. Kidman ten times in the two weeks 
after the accident and was then referred by him to Dr. Gordon 
Evans, an M.D. Dr. Evans had been plaintifffs personal and 
family doctor for a number of years and was his brother-in-law 
(R 440, L9-13; R 441, L4-6). 
Dr. Evans saw plaintiff two or three times a week for 
a period of time, referred him to Dr. Winter, a radiologist, 
for x-rays, and then referred him to Dr. Rich, a neurologist (R 
442, L17-24). 
Dr. Rich gave plaintiff a myelogram and referred him 
to Elizabeth Morris, a physical therapist, for therapy for a 
four month period (R 442, L18-R 444, L6). 
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This treatment and passage of time gave plaintiff 
substantial improvement, but he was still having back problems 
so he was referred by Dr. Evans to Dr. Richard Goka, a 
physiatrist. A physiatrist is not to be confused with a 
psychiatrist, but rather is an M.D. whose speciality is 
rehabilitiation of people after injury or illness (R 524, L21-
R 525, LI)• 
Dr. Goka first saw Mr. Sanders April 13, 1983. He 
diagnosed plaintiff as having a condition of fibrositis caused 
by a cervical strain. He relied on the reports of Dr. Evans 
who had seen plaintiff promptly after the accident detailing 
the facts of the cervical strain (R 524, L12-R 525, LI; R 526, 
L22-R 527, L14), and of Dr. Rich (R 582, L9-R 583, L3). 
Dr. Goka testified that a cervical strain usually 
heals in 6 to 12 weeks, but fibrositis can be caused by the 
strain during that period of time, that the fibrositis is 
incurable and persists for life (R 527, L15-R 528, L10). He 
testified that plaintiff was disabled by his fibrositis (R 528, 
Lll-19), and that the fibrositis was caused solely by the 
cervical strain plaintiff received September 25, 1982, in his 
collision with defendant (R 525, L18-R 526, L21). 
In regard to the fibrositis, Dr. Goka testified that 
it is a recognized disease entity in the medical speciality of 
rheumatology, and that plaintiff had traumatic fibrositis. 
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As an injury to a joint can produce traumatic arthritis, an 
injury to soft tissue can produce traumatic fibrositis (R 528, 
L20-R 529, L6). 
In testifying that the condition is not curable and 
plaintiff would have it permanently, he explained that 
fibrositis causes permanently contracted muscles in the back 
and the permanent muscle contraction necessarily causes pain (R 
534, L10-18; R534, L19-R 535, L15; R 538, L25-R 539, L6; (R539, 
L2-R 541, L9). 
Dr. Goka further testified that in fibrositis it is 
the pain that makes the patient disfunctional stating that pain 
is the greatest disfunction that people have. He also 
testified that an extreme fibrositis sufferer always has pain, 
the question is one of degree only (R 542, L13-R 543, L16), 
and that plaintiff was at the extreme end of the fibrositis 
disability spectrum (R 543, L23-R 544, L16; R 544, L23-R 545, 
R 546, L12). 
Dr. Goka referred plaintiff to St. Luke's hospital in 
Phoenix, Arizona, which has an outstanding chronic pain clinic, 
for treatment. Dr. Goka testified that St. Luke's medical 
reports were submitted to him and these concurred that Mr. 
Sanders had suffered a cervical strain which in turn caused the 
fibrositis (R 547, L21-R 548, L12). 
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Plaintiff had also been complaining since the accident 
of tinnitus, a two tone ringing of his ears. As to this, Dr. 
Goka testified that independent testing performed by Dr. 
Nielson, an ear specialist, stated that the tinnitus was a 
direct result of the subject automobile accident, and it also 
is a permanent condition and would aggravate the fibrositis by 
causing tension (R 548, L18-R 551, L13; R S52, L24-R 553, L6)f 
Dr. Goka further testified that plaintiff had a work 
potential of only extremely limited, light work of 10 to 20 
hours per week in his future, and that his present monthly 
medical expense of $60 to $70 for medications would only 
increase, and his future annual medical expense would run from 
$2,500 to $5,000 per year to treat the fibrositis (R 556, Ll-R 
557, L 14). 
In regard to the diagnosis of fibrositis, Dr. Goka 
cited various medical texts explaining its nature and diagnosis 
including the American Arthritis Foundation, that fibrositis is 
a real and recognized disease entity (R 558, L6R 560, L18). 
An important point, as will be seen later, is that Dr. 
Goka testified that a doctor cannot diagnosis fibrositis unless 
he specifically checks the fourteen ,ftrigger points" for pain, 
color and swelling. (R 558, L3-12). 
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In regard to this, Dr. Goka testified that a doctor 
has to know exactly where the trigger points are. When these 
points, mostly in the back, are touched, in connection with 
touching other parts of the back so the patient isn't alerted, 
the patient will respond with such a strong pain reflex that it 
is called by doctors a "jump response." The examination of Mr. 
Sanders revealed that he had twelve specific fibrositis trigger 
points and that, in addition to the jump reflex, when the 
trigger points are touched, an immediate swelling and redness 
in an area about the size of a quarter will appear at the 
trigger points. This swelling and dermographia are specific 
diagnostic clinical and objective, not subjective, findings to 
confirm the existence of fibrositis (R 529, Ll-R 532, L23; R 
563, L7-R 564, LI; R 571, L6-R 572, L2). 
On cross examination, Dr. Goka admitted that on first 
seeing plaintiff, he had hoped that he would be able to return 
to full time work in six months (R 611, L2-16), but rather than 
.improving, plaintiff had worsened, that he had continuously 
seen plaintiff, and his present diagnosis was that of a 
permanent disability (R 567, L9-R 569, L15). 
When asked on cross-examination if fibrositis was not 
a subjective condition, Dr. Goka stated that it was clearly 
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objective, that fibrositis suffers were not affected by the 
11secondary gain" syndrome and that it can't be faked (R 571, 
L2-R 572, L2; R 572, L22-R 575, L15; R 576, L6-R 578, L8). Dr. 
Goka agreed that most fibrositis patients can work full time 
but depending on degree some, like plaintiff, are disabled 
(R578, L8; R579, L18). 
As Dr. Goka did not see plaintiff until seven months 
after the accident, he was asked on what he based his diagnosis 
of the original injury caused by the accident. As above 
mentioned, he referred to the report of Dr. Gordon Evans and 
also to the neurologist, Dr. Rich, to whom Dr. Evans had first 
referred plaintiff. Dr. Goka read from Dr. Rich's report which 
stated that plaintiff had sustained a ff... fairly severe 
musculotendenous strain." (R 582, L9-R 583, L3). 
Dr. Goka was the only doctor called by plaintiff. 
However, in his testimony, he made specific reference to the 
findings of two other doctors, Drs. Evans and Rich both of whom 
saw plaintiff promptly after the accident, and reported that 
plaintiff had suffered a cervical strain in his collision with 
defendant (R 526, L22-R 527, L14; R 549, L20-R 551, L13; R 582, 
L9-R 583, L3). 
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This is not the only accident in which plaintiff had 
been involved* It was the third out of four. 
No secret was made of this. Plaintiff's counsel 
referred to them in his opening statement (R 329, L18-25), and 
plaintiff gave details on them in his direct testimony (R 433, 
L4-R 438, L19). 
The fourth accident occurred in July, 1983, ten months 
after defendant hit plaintiff (R 436, L4-R 438, L19). At that 
time, plaintiff had already incurred $3,000 in medical expense 
due to the accident caused by defendant (R 731, Lll-20), so it 
had no bearing on whether defendant injured him before then. 
In regard to the first accident, plaintiff testified 
that it occurred in about 1981, caused a small dent to his car 
and no injury (R 433, L9-14). 
In regard to the second accident, he said that caused 
minor car damage, gave him a sore neck for a few days, and had 
occurred two or three weeks before defendant struck him. (R 
434, L15-R 436, L3). 
Plaintiff testified on direct, as his attorney 
admitted in his opening statement, that plaintiff had previosly 
had cancer which had been successfully treated, involving the 
removal of a testicle, and a hernia. (R 451, L6-R 452, L4). 
He had also had a low back fusion in 1978. (R 488, L2-8). 
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Plaintiff testified that he was working fulltime on 
September 25, 1982f and that he had no time loss nor medical 
treatment from either of the two previous automobile accidents, 
(R 433, L9-14; R 434, L15-R 436, L3; R 520, L20-R 521, L19). 
Defendant was fully informed as to these two prior accidents 
because, by coincidence, the same insurance company represented 
both defendant and the drivers in the two prior accidents, 
information plaintiff supplied defendant in his deposition. 
Defendant introduced no evidence of any kind that 
plaintiff had not been working fulltime when struck by 
defendant nor that he had had any medical treatment relating 
to the two prior accidents, nor to any other injury. 
Plaintiff has never been impeached to the slightest 
degree on the withholding of information about having been 
affected by the other automobile accidents, his prior health 
history, or any other injury, with one exception. 
When defendant testified, she said that after the 
accident occured, she went to plaintiff's car and that 
plaintiff was sitting in the driver's seat and said to her: 
"He told me that he thought he might 
have a whiplash because he had had one 
once before." 
(R 375, L10-R 376, L14). 
The statement by defendant does not indicate that 
plaintiff was suffering from any disability at the time of his 
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collision with her. It does indicate that he had immediate 
pain caused by her hitting him. 
Defendant did enter as evidence that plaintiff had 
overstated one medical bill, but responsibility for this was 
assumed in court by plaintiff's attorney on the basis that he, 
not plaintiff, had put together the totals on the medical 
expenses. (R 519, L10-R 520, L13). Defendant also introduced 
evidence that plaintiff was not doing well as an insurance 
salesman and had in fact made more money two years before the 
accident occurred, in 1980, than he did in 1982. (R 515, L12-R 
517, L14). Defendant also introduced evidence that after 
plaintiff's injury, plaintiff's wife was unemployed for a 
period of time, and that plaintiff's first wife died after 
having had five children, whom plaintiff then raised, and that 
between plaintiff's present marriage and his first marriage, 
plaintiff had had a short second marriage. (R 494, Ll-10; R 
495, L4-R 499, L14). 
Defendant then introduced evidence that severely 
impeached plaintiff, but only if that testimony is not analyzed 
and is misunderstood. 
Defendant called two doctors, Dr. John Barbuto, a 
neurologist, and Dr. Edward Spencer, an orthopod. 
Plaintiff's original injury had been a cervical 
strain, a whiplash. (R 441, L25-R 442, R 525, L 18-R 526, 
L21). 
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Concurring with the testimony of Dr. Goka, (R 527, 
L15-R 528, L10), Drs. Spencer (R 755, L18-R 756, L6) and 
Barbuto (R 671, L4-13) testified that the symptoms of a 
cervical strain clear, that is the healing period, in 3 to 12 
weeks, a three-month period at longest. 
Both Drs. Barbuto and Spencer testified that they saw 
no symptoms of the original injury at the time they examined 
plaintiff. This is to be expected as Dr. Barbuto saw plaintiff 
six months, and Dr. Spencer 18 months, after the accident, so 
that they could not have been expected to see the original 
strain by their own testimony on its healing period. 
Dr. Goka saw plaintiff seven months, April, 1983, 
after plaintifffs accident. He based his findings of cervical 
strain on the report of the immediate attending physician Dr. 
Evans, and incorporated the work and tests of the doctors 
before him into his treatment of the patient, plaintiff, and 
referred to them in his testimony. (R 526, L22-R 527, L14; R 
549, L20-R 551, L31; R 582, L9-R 583, L3). 
Opposed to this, Drs. Barbuto and Spencer chose to 
ignore and to not review any of the existing reports and tests 
concerning plaintiff until after they had finished their 
examination of him, even though material had been delivered to 
them. (R 668, L21-R 669, L10). Dr. Spencer explained he 
wasn't ,finterested in the innuendos and the inferences" of the 
treating physicians. (R 775, L7-13). 
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In Utah it is standard practice for an injured party 
to call only his attending physician and have him incorporate 
into his testimony the necessary findings and tests of the many 
other doctors and hospitals usually involved. Plaintiff did 
so. It saves time and a lot of money. Defendants have the 
right to call the other doctors, or use their reports in cross 
examination. 
Neither Dr. Barbuto nor Dr. Spencer made any claim or 
statement that plaintiff had not been injured as he claimed. 
The testimony of both Dr. Spencer and Dr. Barbuto was 
that they could find no present physiological, mechanical 
reason for plaintiff's symptoms when they examined him. They 
viewed him as being a mental case, and testified at great 
length that his persistent symptoms were induced by "stress 
physiology", "secondary gain" and "compensated accident 
setting" (R 671, L14-R 672, L10; R 673, L13-R 675, L25; R 676, 
L22-R 681, L13; R 682, L24-R 683, L19; R 686, L3-R 687, L3; R 
690, L15-R 691, LI; R 756, L7-24;R 757, L2-21; R 763, L21-24;R 
764, L6-10). 
Dr. Spencer testified that the medical help plaintiff 
needed was psychiatric only. (R 765, L2-R 766, L2). 
The total effect of the testimony of Drs. Barbuto and 
Spencer was tremendously harmful to plaintiff because all of 
their theories of explaining plaintiff's fibrositis symptoms 
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and disability were based on him not being really hurt on the 
dates he was reporting those symptoms to them (R 688, L19-R 
687, L3; R 763, L21-24; R 764, L6-10). Rather, they testified 
that secondary gain means that a person claims persistent 
symptoms only when he expects to get money from his injury and 
that a person with a comparable injury who can't expect any 
money, promptly gets well; stress physiology is a situation 
where a person who cannot deal with life finds n easy out when 
he has an injury as he thereafter blames the injury for all of 
his problems and stops functioning; the compensated accident 
setting similarly refers to a person whose symptoms persist not 
because they are real and because he is hurt, but because he 
sees where he can make gain from the symptoms, whether 
financial or emotional. 
In regard to plaintiff's fibrositis the testimony of 
Drs. Spencer and Barbuto was remarkable. 
Dr. Barbuto testified that he was very familiar with 
the literature on fibrositis, and that through his computerized 
"med-line" research he had pulled and reviewed all the books 
and articles on fibrositis. He had an impressive list of these 
publications in hand when he testified. (R 693, L21-R 695, 
L22). 
On cross examination, Dr. Barbuto admitted that he had 
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read only one of all of the publications to which he had 
referred as a basis for his expertise. (R 699, L15-R 701, 
L23). He was then asked if he had tested plaintiff for any of 
the 14 trigger points which are used to diagnose the condition 
of fibrositis. He admitted that he did not know where those 
trigger points were and was forced to admit that he had not 
rested plaintiff for them- (R 708, L4-25-R 709, LI). 
Dr. Barbuto was then asked about the one article he 
claimed he had read: 
Q (By Mr. King): You said you had read that article 
and you said you don't know where the trigger points are? 
A. Uh--Uh. 
Q, Let me direct your attention to that diagram and 
that article. Doesn't that show you where the trigger points 
are with precision and doesn't the article have page after 
page, defining exactly where they are and how to locate them. 
A. It does show that. (R 709-L12-20) 
Accordingly, it was clear that Dr. Barbuto if he had 
read the article at all, had not learned.how to locate the 
trigger points, whose palpatation is essential to the diagnosis 
of fibrositis. (R 529, Lll-R 530, L22; R 532, L6-R 533, L8). 
In essence then Dr. Barbuto was in no position to 
rebut the testimony of Dr. Goka that plaintiff had fibrositis, 
because Dr. Barbuto admitted he didn't know how to diagnose it. 
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The worst thing about Dr. Barbuto's testimony is that 
ne callously told the jury that plaintiff wasn't hurt, had no 
symptoms and was motivated by gain, when actually he wouldn't 
or couldn't, diagnose the organic disease caused by the 
accident from which plaintiff genuinely suffered. 
Dr. Spencer's testimony was equally superficial. He 
acknowledged that he had talked to doctors at the University of 
Utah medical school and that fibrositis was recognized as a 
legitimate distinct disease entity. (R 780, L16-R 781, L7). 
Notwithstanding that, in his own practice of about 25 patients 
a day he had never made a diagnosis of fibrositis. (R 776, 
L23-R 777, L14). (This would indicate that a good number of his 
patients who had fibrositis went undiagnosed by him and 
accordingly were not given appropriate treatment). 
The testimony that Dr. Spencer gave in regard to 
plaintiff's fibrositis was tremendously damaging to plaintiff. 
Dr. Spencer testified that he was familiar with the 
trigger points of fibrositis and that when he palpated these 
with plaintiff paying attention to what he was doing, that 
plaintiff would flinch and show tenderness. However, if Dr. 
Spencer distracted plaintiff and then touched the same trigger 
points, plaintiff would not show pain or tenderness. This led 
Dr. Spencer to conclude that plaintiff was faking his symptoms 
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of fibrositis and that he really didn't have fibrositis at all. 
(R 761, L20-R 762, L16; R 782, L16-22). Instead he testified 
that, contrary to plaintiff's testimony of pain and disability, 
that plaintiff had no physical impairment, (R 763, L21-24), and 
was capable of full time work. (R 764, L6-10). 
The trouble with Dr. Spencer's testimony takes a bit 
of thoughtful analysis. He based his finding of the trigger 
points simply on touching areas where plaintiff would flinch. 
(R 751, L2-10; R 761, L20-R 762, L16). Plaintiff's failure to 
flinch when those same areas were touched when he wasn't aware 
of what the doctor was doing led the doctor to believe that he 
was falsifying, chat plaintiff's complaints were grossly 
overexaggerated. (R 761, L20-R 762, L16). He stated 
plaintiff's troubles were "psychogenic." (R 756, L7-R 757, 
L21). 
On first impression Dr. Spencer's testimony shows 
plaintiff as being a malingerer, which could well lead the jury 
to a total disbelief in Mr. Sander's testimony and accordingly 
its finding that he was not injured at all. 
The defect in Dr. Spencer's testimony is that he 
viewed the trigger points as being definable solely by a pain 
response of the patient. He testified fibrositis diagnosis is 
difficult because "it is based solely on subjective feelings". 
(R 761, L5-19). 
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This is wrong. 
In fact, like Dr. Barbuto, Dr. spencer did not know 
how to diagnose fibrositis. The diagnosis is properly made by 
objective, clinical findings not ''solely on subjective 
feelings". 
As testified to by Dr. Goka and supported by the 
literature he incorporated, (R 529, Lll-R 531, Lll; R 532, 
L4-24; R 558, L6-R 560, L18), and by the trigger point article 
that Dr. Barbuto flunked, (R 708, Lll-24), a pain response to 
touch of a trigger point where the patient has fibrositis does 
occur. However, the trigger point is not established by that 
because a patient can be sore in many parts of their body. The 
trigger point is in fact diagnosed not only by pain but by the 
immediate swelling at the trigger point with the area, about 
the size of a quarter, becoming dark red. This is clinical and 
objective diagnosis of unmistakable, unique symptoms. (R 532, 
L7-21). 
This means that Dr. Spencer really didn't understand 
fibrositis. Particularly, he didn't understand, which could 
have led the jury to misunderstand, that the diagnosis of 
fibrositis is not based on subjective complaints, but on the 
clinically verifiable roseate coloring and swelling at the 
trigger points, when they are palpated. 
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If Dr. Spencer really had any understanding of how to 
diagnose fibrositis, he would not have called the diagnosis 
"solely subjective/1 and examined plaintiff only by palpation. 
He would have looked for, and reported on, the swelling and 
dermographia. He entirely failed to mention them. 
Dr. Spencer*s patent misdiagnosis of Mr. Sander's 
fibrositis, his conclusion Mr. Sanders did not have fibrositis 
and was faking his symptoms, could well have led to the jury 
verdict against Mr. Sanders. 
Both Dr. Spencer and Dr. Barbuto are bright, 
articulate and personable young doctors. Such people can 
persuade, and damaging cross examination be forgiven them. 
However, a jury verdict has to be based on substantial 
competent evidence. As Dr. Spencer did not know how to 
diagnosis plaintiff for fibrositis his own testimony does not 
lead to the conclusion that Dr. Goka and St. Luke's Hospital 
were in error in finding that Mr. Sanders had fibrositis. 
Rather, it explains why Dr. Spencer with all the thousands of 
patients he has dealt with in his own practice has never 
diagnosed fibrositis on his own. 
In sum, neither of the doctors called by defendant, 
Dr. Barbuto or Dr. Spencer, introduced any competent evidence 
that plaintiff had not been injured in September, 1982, nor 
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that plaintiff was not suffering from fibrositis as a direct 
consequence of the accident at the time of the trial. However 
the weight of their testimony that plaintiff was not hurt, that 
he could work, that the only medical help he needed was 
psychiatric, must be what misled the jury to find plaintiff was 
not injured at all by defendant. (R 761, L20-R 766, L2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Summary omitted as plaintiff states only one point. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
AS PLAINTIFF PRODUCED SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT 
INJURED HIM, AND THE DEFENDANT'S 
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE WENT NOT TO THE 
ORIGINAL INJURY, BUT ONLY TO ITS 
DURATION AND SEVERITY, THE JURY VERDICT 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT CAUSED PLAINTIFF 
NO INJURY AT ALL SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The jury found defendant liable to plaintiff for their 
accident, but also found the accident had not injured 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's position is that the jury must have 
misunderstood, or been misled by, the evidence. 
Plaintiff takes this position because there was no 
competent evidence that defendant did not injure plaintiff at 
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all, and substantial competent evidence that she did injure 
him. There was speculative evidence that she did not injure 
him. 
Utah's legal criteria for review of such a basic issue 
of fact is well established. 
1. A verdict must be supported by evidence that is (a) 
substantial and (b) competent. Christensen v. Shear, Utah 
Supreme Court, No. 19679, filed 8-10-84; Watters v. Querry, 
Utah, 626 P.2d 455 (1981); E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, 
Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons, Inc., Utah, 665 P.2d 1320 (1983). 
2. If it seems clear the jury has misunderstood or 
misapplied the evidence, its verdict should be set aside. 
Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 (1958) 
(concurring opinion). 
3. A verdict cannot be based on speculative evidence. 
Nelson v. Trujillo, Utah, 657 P.2d 730 (1982). 
Application of these three criteria to the evidence 
shows what caused the jury to go amiss. 
First, a synopsis of plaintiff's evidence. 
He was 53 years old when the accident occurred. (R 340, 
L24-25). He was in good health and suffering from no injury. (R 
362, L22-R 363, L4). He felt immediate back and neck pain when 
defendant's car struck his car. (R 363, L8-20). Plaintiff's 
wife confirmed this. (R 616, L15-R 617, L16). 
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Plaintiff was treated promptly, first by a 
chiropractor, Dr. Kidman, and in two weeks from the accident by 
an M.D, Dr. Gordon Evans, who diagnosed him as having suffered 
a cervical strain in the collision. (R 526, L22-R 527, L14). 
Dr. Evans diagnosis was confirmed by a neurologist, Dr. Rich, 
to whom Dr. Evans had referred plaintiff. (R 582, L9-R 583, 
L3). When plaintiff continued to have trouble, Dr. Evans 
refered him to a board certified physiatrist, Dr. Goka, whose 
specialty is rehabiliation medicine, (R 523, L21-R 524, L4), 
who has since remained as plaintiff's attending physician. 
Dr Goka diagnosed plaintiff as having traumatic 
fibrositis caused by the cervical strain. (R 525, L18-R 526, 
L21). 
Dr. Goka referred plaintiff to Dr. Nielsen, an ear 
specialist for tinnitus, ringing of the ears, and Dr.Nielsen 
verified that plaintiff had that condition and it was caused by 
the accident. (R 548, L18-R 549, L19; R 549, L20-R 551, L13). 
Dr. Goka also referred plaintiff to the chronic pain center at 
St* Luke's Hospital in Phoenix. It confirmed his finding that 
plaintiff had fibrositis. (R 546, L13- R547, L10; R 547, L21-R 
548, L12). 
Thus the fact that plaintiff had a healed cervical 
strain that had caused traumatic fibrositis, as an injury to a 
joint can cause arthritis, was adequately proved by evidence 
that was substantial and competent. 
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This is not a minor case. 
Dr. Goka testified that plaintiff will be permanently 
disabled by the pain incident to the fibrositis, (R 535, 
L10-18; R 539, L2-R 541, L9; R 541, L10-R 542, Lll; R 543, 
L23-R 544, L16), because the pain is so severe that it will 
ffoverpower his ability to concentrate11, (R 552, L4-8-R 552, L8) 
that plaintiff is at the extreme end of the spectrum of 
fibrositis disability, (R 543, L23-R 544, L16), that his 
present medication expense of $60-$70 per month will continue 
for the rest of his life, (R 464, L10-16; R 556, Ll-R 556, L20) 
and that his future medical expense to reduce the symptoms of 
the fibrositis will be $2,500-$5,000 per year. (R 556, L21-R 
557, L14). What can such a person see as his future? 
It is easiest to review by breaking plaintiff's claim 
into its two component parts—the original cervical strain and 
the subsequent fibrositis. 
Only the strain has to be proved to overcome the 
verdict of no injury, but it was on the fibrositis that 
defendant built her defense. 
In regard to the cervical strain, defendant introduced 
no evidence that any of plaintiff's prior health problems, 
cured cancer, a hernia repair and a back fusion, related to the 
sprain. The fusion was in plaintiff's low back, (R 488, L2-8), 
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while a cervical strain is in the neck and upper back. 
In regard to other accidents causing the cervical 
strain, the 4th, last one, of July, 1983, can be disregarded. 
Plaintiff had already incurred $3,000 in medical expense. (R 
510, L8-16). If the issue were the amount, not the bare 
existence, of damages, then that accident would be relevant. 
In regard to the two prior accidents, defendant 
introduced no evidence to rebut plaintiff's testimony that 
these had been minor, that while he got a sore neck from the 
last one, he had received no injury from either of them 
adequate to cause him to file a claim with the drivers of the 
other vehicles, even though in both cases plaintiff had been 
rear-ended so he had good claims, that he had incurred no 
medical expense nor lost any time from work due to either 
accident. (R 433, L9-R 436, L3). 
Defendant failed to introduce evidence of any other 
accidents not volunteered by plaintiff in his attorney's 
opening statement and in plaintiff's own testimony. 
Christensen v. Shear, supra, is the opposite side of 
the coin. There, plaintiff acknowledged one previous accident 
in a snowmobile, but claimed her later accident with defendant 
was the sole cause of her injury. At trial, she was severely 
impeached in this testimony by evidence of two major accidents 
that she had concealed. Accordingly, in the Christensen case, 
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in a verdict identical to the one here, when the jury found 
defendant liable, but that defendant had not injured plaintiff, 
there was substantial competent evidence upon which the jury 
could make that finding. 
Plaintiff accepts that rationale. He argues that the 
lack of such impeachment in his case justifies an opposite 
result. 
Plaintiff does not overlook that the defendant quoted 
plaintiff at the accident scene as saying that "he told me he 
might have a whiplash because he had one once before". (R 652, 
L4-9). That was the only evidence of any prior whiplash. 
There was no evidence of any medical treatment attendant to it 
nor loss of time, such as plaintiff proved unmistakably 
immediately following his collision with defendant. 
While defendant's quote of plaintiff that he had had a 
previous whiplash has to be given some weight, that comment, 
devoid of any evidence of any effect on plaintiff of such a 
previous injury is not substantial. Similarly, it is not 
competent to prove that she did not injure him as in the same 
statement she quoted, plaintiff said that she had. 
To be "competent" evidence has to be probative of a 
relevant fact. 29 Am Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 257, page 307. A 
statement a person once had an injury is not a statement that 
the person now suffers from that injury. 
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Finally, in regard to the original injury, neither of 
defendant's doctors are in a position to say plaintiff had not 
sustained it. They" gave no testimony that he had not. This is 
because they examined him for the first time long after the 
3-12 week healing period for the cervical strain had run. Dr. 
Barbuto saw plaintiff six months after the accident (R 671, 
L4-13), and Dr. Spencer 18 months after the accident (R 756, 
L3-6). 
What comes close, and what could have misled the jury 
was testimony such as this from Dr. Spencer: 
Q. (By Mr. Burton) Now, assuming that Mr. Sanders 
felt the symptoms that he described to you, do you have an 
opinion whether or not the accident was the cause of the 
symptoms? 
A. What I thought were the symptoms were possibly 
relating to pre-existing changes, degenerative changes that we 
talked about and probably some other reason that I couldn't 
objectively measure. I felt that the symptoms didn't fit 
objective patterns. They were what we call "psychogenic in 
origin". (R 756, L7-15). 
Dr. Spencer then went on for the next 3 pages of 
transcript, (R 756, L16-R 759, L7) to talk about psychogenic 
problems and secondary gain as being plaintiff's "alternative 
reason for his symptoms." (R 757, L6-7). 
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The jury could well have taken this testimony of Dr. 
Spencer as indicating or implying that plaintiff had never been 
injured. Closely read, and taken in context with the other 
evidence that the symptoms of the cervical sprain would have 
disappeared long before Dr. Spencer saw plaintiff, this 
statement means only that at the time, in 1984, that Dr. 
Spencer saw plaintiff, plaintiff did not then have symptoms of 
a whiplash related to his accident. 
Similarly when Dr. Barbuto was asked about plaintiff's 
original injury, it was in the following form: 
Q. "...Did you form an opinion as to whether that had 
healed?" (R 672, L15-16) [Emphasis added] 
Dr. Barbuto responded by saying that he didn't have any 
significant data to confirm a serious injury. He added, 
"Initially, he didn't even go to a doctor, he went to a 
masseuse. If he was majorly injured, that probably would not 
have been his course." (R 672, L17-22). Dr. Barbutofs 
slighting reference to a masseuse, was of course to the 
chiropractor Dr. Kidman. Dr. Barbuto then went on to page 688 
of the transcript talking about stress physiology, secondary 
gain and psychogenic conditions as plaintiff's motivations. 
Again, his answer could have been understood by the 
jury as being that plaintiff wasn't injured at all, when the 
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only question
 p0.t to him was whether the injury had healed at 
the time Dr. Barbuto saw him. 
This is part of the basis on which plaintiff claims the 
jury could have been misled, or have misunderstood the 
evidence. 
If on review it appears a verdict is wrong, there is 
still the strong impulse to affirm it because the jurors are 
the jurors. 
A reasonable hypothesis explaining why an honest jury 
could go astray helps meet that impulse. 
The confusion in reference dates, as the doctors chose 
to answer the questions, as to plaintiff's original injury, or 
his condition when they saw him has been touched on above. 
The damaging, but misleading because of their lack of 
qualification and careful diagnosis, testimony given by Drs. 
Barbuto and Spencer concerning plaintiff's fibrositis is 
outlined in detail in the Statement of Facts at pages 14 to 23. 
Here there are two intertwined reasonable hypothesis to 
explain the jury verdict. 
First, they might have felt, that plaintiff had so 
grossly exaggerated his condition that he was entitled to 
receive nothing. If one overreaches, one get one's hand 
slapped. It would be comparable to a doctor who doesn't x-ray 
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a broken leg, so not diagnosing it, saying the person is 
malingering and should walk just like anybody else. Unless the 
listener realizes that the doctor has missed the diagnosis, 
that there is a physical cause for conduct, then the doctor is 
believable that greed, laziness, or other weakness of character 
is the real reason for the conduct. 
Second hypothesis is that the testimony of the doctors 
of no findings of injury may have been understood by the jury 
as being that plaintiff was never injured in the first place, 
when neither doctor in fact said that, but by their phraseology 
strongly suggested that, notwithstanding the testimony of both 
of them that plaintiff's original condition would have healed 
when they first saw him. (R 671, L4-13; R 755, L18-R 756, L6). 
It would have required the jury to add up all the facts to 
arrive at that understanding, and this kind of error, not 
adding up and cross-checking the facts is one all of us, even 
jurors, are prone to make. 
While neither of these hypothesis have an overwhelming 
immediate attractiveness, the improbable becomes the probable 
when standard .probabilities fail to explain an event, i.e., my 
wallet is probably in my pocket or my dresser. If not, the 
improbable becomes the probable and I had better check the 
restaurant where I went to dinner last night. Here, as it is 
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not probable that juries will usually enter a wrong verdict, 
but it appears that here they have, then the doctors1 testimony 
could have sunk plaintiff when, closely read it should not have 
done so. 
Negative evidence is a form of competent evidence where 
"the testimony of a witness is not confined to what he saw or 
heard, but he may also state what he did not see or hear. Of 
course, negative evidence is weak and usually not sufficient to 
overcome positive testimony that the alleged fact did exist. 
29 Am.Jur2d. Evidence, Sec. 258, page 309. 
The negative evidence given by Drs. Barbuto and Spencer 
that they did not see evidence of the original injury when they 
examined plaintiff is not sufficient to overcome the positive 
evidence of Drs. Evans and Rich, both because of the time lapse 
before they saw him, but also as indicated in the above quote 
of law negative evidence ordinarily lacks the strength of 
positive evidence. 
It was only on cross-examination that plaintiff found 
first as to Dr. Barbuto and then as to Dr. Spencer that they 
weren't qualified to diagnose fibrositis. By then their 
testimony on secondary gain, compensated accident setting (R 
671, L14-R 672, L10), and such, was in. The bell cannot be 
unrung once rung. Their testimony also was admissible having 
some probative value as to the degree of plaintiff's physical 
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impairment. Evidence admissible as competent on one point, is 
not barred because not competent on another point. State v. 
Cooper, 114 U 531, 201 P2d 764. 29 AmJur Evidence, Sec. 262, 
page 310. 
Accordingly, the jurors heard the doctors testify that 
plaintiff was not hurt, (R 763, L6-10), that the only doctor he 
needed was a psychiatrist, (R 765, L2-R 766, L2), and that he 
was probably motivated by an urge for secondary gain, (R 676, 
L22-R 688, L19), before they ever heard the cross-examination 
showing that the doctors lacked foundation. 
The cross-examination may well have come too late. 
Many of us hear enough on a point to make up our minds and then 
we go to sleep, or our minds otherwise close. Republicans 
accuse democrats of this and vice versa. 
Why did defendant choose to use as its experts two 
doctors who were not experts in fibrositis? Consider the 
question. 
It cannot be that defendant was unadvised as she had 
the records of Dr. Goka and St. Luke's Hospital sent to Dr. 
Spencer before he examined plaintiff. Dr. Spencer chose not to 
review these until after he examined plaintiff. (R 774, L16-R 
775, L19). 
Dr. Spencer acknowledged that he knew of, and had 
talked to, experts in fibrositis at the University of Utah 
Medical School. (R 780, L16-R 781, L7). Defendant could have 
used doctors such as those as experts. 
The answer lies in the testimony of Dr. Spencer: 
"And so, if you don't find the objective 
reasons, arthritis, fracture, 
dislocation, then you have to assume 
there is some other cause and you have to 
look for a psychological ideology." (R 
756, L24-R 757, L2). 
Defendant did not want a doctor who would test for 
fibrositis, as Dr. Goka had, who would review all records and 
then test carefully. (R :^ 26f L22-R 527, L14; R 529, Lll-R 533, 
L7). Such a doctor might well have confirmed Dr. Goka and St. 
Luke's. This would have cost defendant money. It served 
defendant better to use doctors who would not test for 
fibrositis, and then, as Dr. Spencer explained, testify that 
plaintiff had a "psychological ideology," because they made no 
objective findings to explain his symptoms. Their job would be 
to sell the case as one where plaintiff was faking for monetary 
gain. 
This is a smokescreen defense. It obscured plaintiff's 
real injury. It worked. That is why this case is under 
appeal. 
It is urged that the entire transcripts of the 
testimony of Dr. Barbuto (R 660-R 713) and of Dr. Spencer (R 
743-R 783) be read. If this is done, it should be as if the 
reader were on the jury—first register the impressions given 
by the terribly damaging direct examinations and only later, on 
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cross, the admissions that the testing was inadequate and that 
existing tests and reports were not reviewed. 
Here, plaintiff has the complicating factor that the 
trial judge refused his motion for new trial. 
Nelson v. Trujillo, Utah 657 P2d 730 (1982) states: 
"Where the trial court has denied the 
motion for new trial, its decision will 
be sustained on appeal if there was fan 
evidentiary basis for the jury's decision 
... .
f
 The trial court's denial of a 
motion for a new trial will be reversed 
only if 'the evidence to support the 
verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make their 
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." 
McCloud v. Baum, Utah, 569 P2d 1125, 1127 (1977); 
Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Co., 27 U2d 
430, 497 P2d 326 (1972). 
It should be noted in Nelson v. Trujillo, supra, that 
the court reversed a damage judgment on the basis that 
plaintiff hadn't proved a basis from which the jury could 
assess his future earning loss, even though plaintiff had 
introduced evidence that the accident had substantially and 
adversely affected his personality, his appearance, and his 
ability to move and work, from which inferentially, as 
plaintiff was 19, an impact on his future earning capacity 
could be reasonably inferred. The trial court had denied 
defendant's motion to reduce damages holding that on the above 
evidence, "The jury could easily conclude that his potential as 
an earner has been substantially reduced." 
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Notwithstanding, the court found such evidence to be 
inadequate to support an instruction on loss of future income 
because the future earning loss was "speculative". Thus, in 
Nelson, really the reviewing court applied the Christensen, 
supra, criteria, that a jury verdict on review by any reviewing 
court has to be supported by substantial, competent evidence, 
not by inference or speculation. 
The jury's finding \hat defendant didn't injure 
plaintiff can only be based on speculation, or 
misunderstanding, as there is simply no evidence to support it. 
In Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U2d 435, 326 P2d 722 (1958), in 
a concurring opinion, Justice Crockett outlined several 
approaches of active judicial interference with jury verdicts 
as the extreme liberal view, rare judicial interference as the 
extreme conservative view, and Utah's middle approach. He did 
it in the context of the trial judge's prerogative on review of 
the jury verdict but the same concepts apply for any reviewing 
court, subject to the deference they give to the trial judge. 
His statement, following, is a good summary of Utah law and it 
touches on an important aspect, which plaintiff urges 
controlled the jury here: 
"The verdict, when supported by 
substantial evidence, should be regarded 
as presumptively correct and should not 
be interfered with merely because the 
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judge might disagree with the result. 
The prerogative should only be exercised 
when, in the view of the trial court, it 
seems clear the jury has misapplied or 
failed to take into account proven facts; 
or misunderstood the law; or made 
findings clearly against the weight of 
the evidence so that the verdict is 
offensive to a sense of justice to the 
extent that he cannot in good conscience 
permit it to stand." [Emphasis added] 
In so stating, Justice Crockett, adjusted to a historic line of 
Utah cases such as People v. Swasey, 6 U 93, 21 P 400 (1889) in 
which the court stated: 
"The verdict must be plainly wrong, and 
if it be manifestly against the weight of 
the evidence, it is the duty of the court 
co set it aside." 
CONCLUSION 
The jury verdict finding defendant liable to plaintiff 
has not been appealed and should stand. 
The jury verdict finding defendant did not injure 
plaintiff should be reversed, and the case should be remanded 
for new trial on damages. 
Plaintiff prays costs. 
DATED March , 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
Attorney for Appellant 
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